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K Y B E R N E T I K A — V O L U M E 11 (1975), N U M B E R 3 
A Probabilistic Approach 
to Automaton-Environment Systems 
IVAN KRAMOSIL 
There are many papers dealing with the automaton-environment systems from deterministic 
point of view. The aim of this paper is to introduce a probabilistic aspect into this field. The 
presented model supposes that the actions of the automaton can involve certain unexpected 
consequences in the environment. Frame axioms are in this model replaced by a new deduction 
rule allowing to assume that some assertion, describing the situation of the environment in a past 
situation is valid also in the present situation under the condition that no explicit information 
about changes concerning this assertion is at disposal. It is proved that there is a positive pro-
bability that the system of assertions the aim of which is to describe the situation in the environ-
ment will become inconsistent. Using the apparatus of random walks we are able to prove that 
under certain conditions this probability of inconsistency tends to one when the number of actions 
performed by the automaton increases. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There are many books and papers dealing with automaton-environment systems 
of various types. Such an investigation is closely connected with some problems 
arising in robotics, cybernetics and automatic problem-solving and it is very difficult 
to define precise borders between these fields of applied science. 
The basis idea on wich an investigation of automaton-environment systems 
is based is the following one: an automaton is situated in certain medium or world 
surrounding it. The automaton is able to observe the medium, to measure some 
of the environment properties or parameters, in general, to obtain some information 
from the medium. Moreover, the automaton is also able to intervene in an active 
form in the medium, to perform some operations and, in this way, to change somehow 
and in certain measure the situation in the environment. In this paper we shall 
assume, moreover, that the automaton can move, i.e. that it is able to change its 
own position in the environment. The automaton activity is not goalless, there is 
a goal, defined usually by the human user, which is to be reached; usually the goal 
is certain situation of the environment which is to be reached. Being able to achieve 
the goal the automaton constructs, in its memory, certain formal description of the 
environment derived from the empirical data, based on an appropriate logical calculus 
and modified during the automaton activity according to its actions. On the other 
hand this formal representation is used in order to derive, which next steps would 
lead to the goal, in other words, the formal representation is used in order to plan 
automaton further activity or behaviour. 
The greatest part of mathematical theories trying to describe this relation between 
the automaton and the environment model the situation in deterministic way. The 
environment is considered to be static or to develop according to some deterministic 
laws known to the user, the way of the reasoning of the automaton is also determinis-
tic and all the automaton actions lead to consequences which are again supposed to be 
deterministic and to be known to the user as well as to the automaton itself. 
In this paper we propose a model of automaton-environment systems which is 
of statistical and probabilistic nature. Here we shall mention only briefly the basic 
aspects in which our model differs from the usual ones; a more detailed description 
can be found in further chapters. 
(1) The properties of various objects in the environment are supposed to be random 
events which are not known a priori neither to the user nor to the automaton. 
(2) The operations which are at the automaton disposal are supposed to be of 
"fuzzy" character, i.e. the operations can lead to some unexpected consequences 
(besides the expected ones). These unexpected consequences are supposed to be 
of statistical nature, i.e. they may accur or need not occur with some probability. 
(3) The frame problem is solved not by the mean of the frame axioms but by 
introducing a new deduction rule, called frame deduction rule. This rule enables 
the following operation (which can be called actualization): If the automaton knows 
that something was valid in some past situation, it assume that the same is valid 
now, in the present situat'on, supposing in the automaton memory is not present 
a formula saying that the assertion ceased to be valid in some past situation between 
those two situations. 
It is shown in this paper that these three assumptions lead to the following princi-
pal conclusions. First, there is a positive probability that the formalized theory 
describing the environment becomes inconsistent. As an inconsistent theory cannot 
serve as an appropriate model of the environment this event forces some intervention 
and it is why it deserves attention. Second, it is possible, if some slight simplifications 
admitted, to describe the automaton behaviour using the apparatus that is developed 
in the random walk theory. Here, our intention is not to describe the internal aspects 
of automaton behaviour, just the picture seen by an external observer. This apparatus 
enables also to derive some further results concerning the inconsistency of the formal 
description in question. Namely, with the probability one, sooner or later this formal-
ized theory becomes inadequate in such a sense that there is at least one formula 
derivable from this representation but not valid in the environment. If, moreover, 175 
the random walk describing the automaton behaviour is symmetric, then, with the 
probability one, the formal representation in question becomes, sooner or later, 
inconsistent. 
There is a connection between this paper and the author's former works [8]; [9]. 
In those work we investigated the probability with which some conclusions derived 
from axioms are valid supposing we knew the probability with which the axioms are 
valid. The problem how to derive the probability for axioms was not taken into 
consideration. In this paper the probability of the validity of our formal representation 
is not supposed to be known a priori, but it is derived from other parameters of the 
probabilistic model proposed to describe the investigated automaton-environment 
system. 
All the chapters of this work contain, in our opinion, a rather detailed intuitive 
description of the problems investigated in the chapter in question, so it seems rather 
not necessary to give some intuitive explanation here. 
As already mentioned the inconsistency of the formal representation of the envi-
ronment is an event which cannot be passively accepted as it menaces all the automa-
ton-environment system in its deep grounds. The author's aim is to develop a pro-
cedure which would either eliminate or at least minimize the probability of inconsisten-
cy mentioned above. Another way, which seems to be hopefull is to use the so called 
"almost consistent" or "quasi-consistent" theories, however, this field of mathematic-
al logic requests, first of all, some more theoretical investigation. 
2. A PROBABILISTIC MODEL OF AUTOMATON BEHAVIOUR 
In this work we intend to develop and to study a probabilistic model of the so 
called automaton-environment systems. Hence, we shall start with a formal description 
of what environment means in the following considerations. 
As the basic space we consider the two-dimensional space I2 of the points with 
integer coordinates, i.e. 
I2 = {<ij}:i,jel}, / = {..., - 1 , 0 , 1 , 2 , . . . } . 
Elements of J2 are called points, denoted by a, b, c, x, y etc. and, moreover, if a e I2 
then at (a2 resp.) denotes, without a special mentioning, the first (the other, resp.) 
coordinate of a, i.e. a = <a«, a2>. 
Let n e N = {0, 1 ,2 , . . .} , let a e I2. The n-th neighbourhood &„(a) of the point a 
is defined as follows 
<P0(fl) = {a } , 
§t(a) = {b:bel
2, \bl -a%\£\, \b2 - a2\ ^ 1} , 
<Sn(a) = U ffiGO • 
yed„- i(o) 
If A c I2, then 6n(A) = U &„(y). Instead of 1-st neighbourhood only the term 
yeA 
neighbourhood will be used. 
The points in I2 can have various properties. In order to be able to describe these 
properties and to discuss them we must have at our disposal an appropriate formalized 
language Sf. In all the rest of this paper we shall speak only about properties of points 
in I2, not about properties of sets of points or about properties of relations among 
points etc. Hence, the first-order predicate calculus seems to be quite adequate for 
this sake, supposing appropriate individual, predicate and functional constants are 
chosen. 
Moreover, we limit ourselves to properties of particular points and we shall not 
take into consideration relations between properties of points. Only exception from 
this rule will be the so called dependence axioms, which will be described later. This 
means, that bur language contains only unary predicates the only variable ranging 
over I2. 
In this way, however, we should be able to speak about points from I2 and their 
properties only from the static point of view, i.e. we should not be able to express 
somehow the fact, that our space and properties of its points can change as the time 
• passes. In this paper we consider the automaton to be the only source of changes in the 
environment, but, as will be shown later, we shall suppose that some consequences 
of the automaton actions can be of random character. 
In order to adapt our language to be able to describe the dynamicity of the environ-
ment we enriche Sf by a new kind of indeterminates — so called situation indeter-
minates. The situation indeterminates range a sets of situations; this set wil be desc-
ribed later, here S can be considered just to be an abstract non-empty set. So we 
obtain a two-sorted language Sf* (S), to any formula P(x) e Sf corresponds the set 
{P(x, s) : seS} c Sf*(S) of formulas. We shall see later that the set of situations 
and that of situation indeterminates need not be distinguished (at lrast from practical 
point of view) and we may allow ourselves this small logical incorrectness for the 
sake of more simple denotation. 
It is a well-known fact that all the formulas of a formalized language based on the 
first-order predicate calculus can be effectively numbered (so called Godelization 
or Godel numbers theory, cf., e.g. [7]). This gives, when applied to Sf and to Sf*, 
that we can introduce a new, ternary predicate V such that 
V:l2 x N x S -> {true, false} 
Said in another way V(a, i, s) means: the point a possesses, in the situation s, the i-th 
property, where f-th property is that one, formally defined by the predicate (unary) 
of Sf having obtained the Godel number i during the process of Godelization. Here, 
every natural number is supposed to be the Godel number of a unuary predicate 
from Sf, the usual process of Godelization can be effectively modified to satisfy this 
condition. The use of situation indeterminates ensures, clearly, that formulas V 
(a, i, s) and 1 V(a, i, s') need not be contradictory, if s =4= s', hence, our description 
is capable to reflex some changes in the environment. 
Using only unuary predicates (not taking into consideration situation indetermi-
nates) our apparatus is not able to describe relations between points and their properties. 
As we want to profit from the advantages of the fact that jj? contains just unary 
predicates we must try to express these relations between points and their properties 
in another way, inside our formalism. For this reason the so called dependence 
axioms will be introduced. The set S of situations is supposed to be countable and 
effectively enumerable. 
Definition 2.1. Dependence axiom of size n(n e N) is a triple (/, g, h) of recursive 
functions defined on Cartesian product (I2)" x N" x S" such that 
/ takes its values in I2, 
g takes its values in N and 
h takes its values in S. 
For any au a2, ..., a„ eI
2 , any i1,i2,...,i„eN and any s l s s2, ..., s„ e S the 
implication 
(2.1) [V(au iuSl)&...& V(an, i„, s„j] -> V(fau ..., a„, iu..., i„, su ..., s„), 
g(au ..., a,„ iu ..., i„, s,, ..., s„), h(au ..., a„, iu ..., i„, su ..., s„)) 
is called an instance of the dependence axiom (/, g, h); the sense of dependence 
axioms is to describe in a concentrated form the set of all their instances. 
Intuitively, a dependence axiom expresses our knowledge about some relations 
among points and their properties which are valid in the environment. Namely, 
having to our disposal the dependence axiom (/, g, h) and knowing that the point a 
possesses the i.-th property in the situation Sj and, at the same time, that the point 
a2 possesses the i2-th property in the situation s2 and, at the same t ime. . . we can 
be sure that the point a0 = f (au ..., a,„ iu ..., i,„ su ..., s„) possesses the property 
i0 = g (au ..., a„, iu ..., i„, s1, ..., s„) in the situation h(a1, ..., a,„ i1,..., i„, s«, ... 
..., s„) = s0. Moreover, a0, i0 and s0 can be effectively computed. 
During the process of Godelization all the properties of points from I2, i.e. all 
the unary predicates of J£? were numbered, including also the contradictory properties, 
as. e.g. "to have just one colour & to be red& to be green". The G6del numbers of such 
predicates will be called degenerated. 
Definition 2.2. Denote by P„ the unary predicate of «S? with the Godel number n. 
Set 
(2.2) Deg = {i:ieN, {(3x) [(x eI2) & P,(x)]} <- {(3x) [(x el2) & P,-(x)]} & 
& (Vx) ((x e I2) -> -\ P,(x))} is valid implication}. 
Natural numbers from Deg are called degenerated. 
Definition 2.3. A dependence axiom (/, a, h) is called consistent if the function g 
satisfies: g(at, ..., an, iL, ..., in, sL, ..., s„) e Deg if and only if some ij, j = n belongs 
to Deg. 
This means that if the property proclaimed by the dependence axiom (/, g, h) 
to be valid for the point f(au ..., a„, iL, .... in, su ..., s„) is contradictory, then some 
of the properties occuring in the premises must be also contradictory and, on the 
other side, from premises containing at least one contradictory property nothing 
positive can be deduced. 
Definition 2.4. A finite set {(fL, gu hL), (/ , , g2, h2), ..., (fm, gm, hm)} of dependence 
axioms (not necessarily of the same size) is called consistent, if for any j •= m 
(fj, gj, hf) is consistent in the sense of the last definition and if for any kL < k2 < ... 
... < kM < m and any n (^- tuples (a\>, ..., a
k(kj)), (i\
J, ..., ikn(kj)), (s\>, ..., s
k(kj)), 
j = 1, 2 , . . . , m, such that 
fki(a\
l,..., akn[kj), i\\ ..., i
k
n[kl), s\\ ..., s
k<{ki)) = 
— f (nk2 nk2 ik2 ik2 « t 2 c t 2 ^ — — 
_ Jk2\
al > • • • > "n(*2)> ' ! > • • • > ' n ( t i ) > ^1 > • • •> S"(k2)) — • • • — 
hold and, at the same time, the same equalities are valid if/ replaced by h the follow-
ing holds: 
the Godel number of the predicate 
Pg(a\\ .... akn{kl), i\\ ..., i*\kl), s\',..., & . , ) ( * ) & 
& Pg(a\\ ..., a%2), i\\ ..., i%2>, #, ..., -&.,) (X)&...& 
... & Pg(a\«, ..., a„X„ A", • • •> »X). A", • • •> *X)) W 
belongs to N — Deg. 
This, from the first sight rather complicated definition, has the following intuitive 
sense: if we are able, using two or more dependence axioms to deduce more properties 
concerning the same point in the same situation, then these properties do not contra-
dict each other. 
Now two special cases of dependence axioms will be introduced, both of them 
being important in the following explanation. 
Definition 2.5. A dependence axiom (/, g, h) is called limited, if there is a natural R 
such that for any n-tuple <a t , a2,..., a„> e (E ) " containing at least one a,-, j ^ n 
with |aij + \a2\ > R and for any n-tuples <(1; i2,..., /„> eN", (su s2, ..., s„> eS" 
there exists k S n with the property: 
f(au...,a,„ i , , , . . , i„, su ..., s„) = ak, !79 
g(au...,an, i , , . . . , i„, s„ ..., s„) = i t , 
/ . ( a . , . . . , a„, iu ..., i„, s« , . . . , s„) = s 4 . 
This gives, that if for some j ^ n |a«| + \a2\ > R, i.e., a is "rather far from the 
beginning" then all the instances of dependence axiom (/, g, h) are of the type 
[V(au /,, sx) & V(a2, i2, sz) & .. . & V(an, i,„ s„)] - V(ak, ik, sk), k ^ n , 
i.e. it is trivial. Hence, a limited dependence axiom enables to make some conclusions 
only for the points not being too far from the beginning (i.e. from <0, 0>). This 
notion expresses the fact, that our knowledge concerning the environment is usually 
limited to a sphere of objects and events being observable by ourmeans of observation. 
The next definition introduces the notion of the similarity dependence axiom. 
Such an axiom expresses the fact that there is a point such that all the points in its 
certain neighbourhood have just the same properties as the points in the correspond-
ing neighbourhood of <0, 0>. 
Definition 2.6. A similarity dependence axiom with the centre a, a e I2, and radius 
R e N is a dependence axiom (/, g, h) of the size 1 with the following properties: 
If bel2, ieN, seS, then 
f(b, i, s) = <£>,. + au b2 + a2} in case | b , | + \b2\ S R , 
f(b,i,s) = b, if | 6 . | + \b2\ > R, 
g(b, i, s) = i, h(b, i, s) = s in all cases. 
Let us finish, at least for now, the developing of the apparatus being to our disposal 
in the rest of this paper in order to describe and investigate the environment and let 
us concern our attention to the other side or aspect of the automaton — environment 
system, i.e. to the automaton. 
It is not the aim of these lines to try to define what the automaton may be. We 
shall limit ourselves to the assumptions, that the automaton is able: 
to change its position in the environment, 
to observe points and their properties — at least some of them, 
to change some properties of points into another ones, 
to make a formal representation of the observed facts, e.g. using some symbolic 
representation in a computer storage, 
to make some conclusions from the information being to its disposal. 
It is beyond our intentions to investigate how all tasks and activities could be 
ensured from the technical and practical point of view. In the rest of this chapter 
we shall try to formalize somehow, what the automaton is supposed to be able to do 
and what it does in various situations. 
All the kinds of activities which the automaton is capable to perform can be divided 
into two great groups, namely: 
(a) actions, representing the "physical" or "dynamical" parts of the automaton 
behaviour. There are the following kinds of actions: movements, operations, observa-
tions, deductions, which will be described below, 
(b) representation, which means that there is, in a storage of the automaton, 
certain set or supply of formulas, either given a priori by the user of the automaton 
as valid, or formed on the basis of observations or derived from the foregoing ones 
using some deduction rules. This set of formulas is dynamically modified according 
to the new observations or other activities of the automaton and the intention is that 
these formulas should represent or describe the environment "in the best possible 
way" in certain sense. There is also the close connection between the representation 
and the action in the sense that with every action certain transformation of the 
representation is associated. 
A detailed description of actions: 
(a) movements: there are eight of them, namely the automaton, being situated 
in a point a el2 is supposed to be able to move itself into any point in (9t (a). We 
shall use the geographical convention and the particular moves will be denoted 
by N, NE, E, SE, S, SW,W,N W, respectively. 
(b) operations: operation expresses the ability of the automaton to change some 
properties of points under conditions. For the sake of simplicity we shall consider, 
in all this paper, only the situation, when the operation changes some property of 
just the point in which the automaton is actually situated and when the conditions, 
under which the operation can be performed, concern only the point in question. 
If the properties of points are, e.g., their colours, then an example of an operation 
can be: "if the point is red, change its colour to green". In such a case any operation 
is defined by a pair (J, fc> of naturals in this way: Op (j, k) means that if V(a,j, s) 
holds, then it is changed to V(a, k, s') where a is the actual position of the automaton, 
s is the actual situation and s' is the situation resulting from s by the application 
of Op(j, k) to s. 
(c) observations: express the ability of the automaton to observe the environment 
and to find or investigate, whether the points have or have not certain properties. 
Any observation is defined by a pair <a, j}, aeI2,jeNin this way: Ob(a, j) means 
that the automaton investigates, whether the point a possesses the j-th property 
or not, i.e. whether V(a, j , s) is valid or not in the actual situation s. 
(d) deductions express the ability of the automaton to use the dependence axioms 
being to its disposal in order to deduce some new formulas of the type V(a, i, s). 
Deduction is defined by a dependence axiom (f, g, h) and three n-tuples <a t , . . . , a„>, 
(iit..., i„>, <s 1 ; . . . , s„> to which the axiom should be applied. It is why deduction 
will be denoted by 
Ded(f, g, h, <a„ ..., a„>, < i „ . . . , /„>, <s1; ..., s„» . 
As the functions f, g, h are recursive, it can be easily seen that there are infinitely 
countably many possible deductions. 
Now, we are in a position to explain and to define precisely what will be understood 
under the notion "situation" used, till now, only in the abstract sense. In the next 
chapter this definition will be slightly modified. 
Definition 2.7. The set S of situations is the minimal set satisfying the following 
conditions: 
(a) s0 is a situation (the so called initial or starting situation), i.e. s0 eS . 
(b) If s e S, then Ns, NEs, Es, SEs, Ss, SWs, Ws, NWseS. 
(c) If s e S and (J, fc> is a pair of natural numbers, then Op(i, j) seS. 
(d)lfseS,aeI2,jeN, then Ob(a, j) s e S. 
(e) If s eS , su s2, ..., s„ eS , flj, ..., a„ el
2, iu ..., i„ eN and (/, g, h) is a depen-
dence axiom of size n, then 
Ded(f,g, h, (au ..., a„>, </,, ..., /„>, <s ls ..., s„})seS. 
Denote by si the set of all actions defined above, i.e. 
s4 = [N, NE, E, SE, S, SW, W, NW, Op(i, j) (i, j e N), Ob(a, j) (a e I2, j e N), 
Ded(f,g,h, <aj , . . . ,a„>, <h,...,i„>, < s 1 , . . . , s „» 
((/, g, h) is a dependence axiom, aj e I2, ij e N, Sj e S , j ~ 1, 2 , . . . , n)} . 
Using the notation A* for the set of all finite sequences of elements from a set A 
and denoting by s < s', s, s' eS the fact that s' can be constructed from s using 
finitely many times Definition 2.7 we can state: 
Theorem 2.1. The set S of situations is the subset of (si \J {s0})*, satisfying the 
following conditions: 
(a) If s = ai,a2, ...,ameS, then a„, = s0, a,- 4= s0 for j < m. 
(b) If s = txia2, ..., a,„ e S, if some a_,-, j < m is a deduction and if s' is a situation 
occuring in tXj, then s' < s. 
Proof . Immediately from the definition of S. 
Having described precisely what the action means we can come back to the problem 
of formal representation of the environment in the automaton. We shall be able, now, 
to describe also in which way the actions reflect in this formal model of the environ-
ment. 
In our paper we do not investigate, how the formal representation and an appro-
priate logical calculus on which it is based serve in order to plan the future actions 
and behaviour of the automaton. This means that we do not investigate which theorem-
-proving algorithms are to the automaton's disposal or how to deduce, from a formal 
proof of an appropriate theorem, the sequence of actions leading to the goal. Some 
papers or monographies dealing with this problems were mentioned in the introducto-
ry part of this paper, some more can be found in the references. The only aspect to 
which we concern our attention in this paper is to study, in which measure the set 
of formulas, being storaged in the automaton memory, together with their logical 
consequences describes in an adequate way the environment. Our special attention 
will be concerned to the problem of frame axioms and to the possibility of inconsisten-
cy of the formalized theory resulting from our formal description when the frame 
axioms are replaced by a new deduction rule, the so called frame deduction rule. 
More details concerning this rule will be given later. 
In the title of this chapter we promised to give a probabilistic approach to the 
description and modelling of the automaton behaviour. Now, we are in a position 
to explain the probabilistic aspects of pur model. 
As it is usual in great part of problem-solving models, also in our description to 
every action certain transformation of the set of valid formulas representing the 
environment is associated. As in the so called STRIPS method such a transformation 
is described by a triple 
{Cond cp, Out cp,In cp} , (p e si , 
where Cond cp, Out cp and In cp are finite sets of formulas of the form V(a, i, s). The 
meaning of these sets can be roughly described as follows: if the formulas from 
Cond (p are valid in some situation, then the action (p is applicable in this situation 
and, as the result of this action, formulas from the set Out cp are not more valid 
in the new situation and must be eliminated from the set of valid formulas, on the 
other side formulas from In cp, not having been, in general, valid before, are valid 
in the new situation and must be joined with the set of valid formulas. 
The usual models for describing the automaton behaviour are based on the pre-
sumption that this triple of sets describes and reflects precisely and correctly all the 
consequences of an action in the environment. In this paper we leave this presumption. 
We assume, now, that the changes in the environment, involved by an action, are 
of probabilistic character. Namely, if the formulas from Cond cp are valid, the action 
cp is applicable and if it is applied, again, formulas from Out cp are not more valid 
in the new situation. However, now we assume, that, with some probability, even 
some other formulas, having been valid before and not contained in Out cp are not 
more valid in the new situation. And the same assumption is connected with the set 
In cp, it is possible, with a positive probability, that there are formulas not having 
been valid before, which are valid after the application of cp and which are not 
contained in In cp. 
To describe this situation we shall assume, in what follows, that Cond cp is again 
a finite set of formulas, but not Out cp and In cp. Now, Out cp is a pair (Out0 cp, 
(fcp)} and In cp is a pair </n0 cp, (gcp)} such that if # " is the set of all formulas of the 
form V(a, i, s), then o«r0 cp c if and (fcp), (gcp) are real functions defined on W, 
taking their values in <0, 1> and such that if V(a, i, s) e Out0 <p(V(a, i, s) e In0 <p, 
resp.), then (ftp) (V(a, i, s)) = 1 ((gcp) (V(a, i, s)) = 1, resp.). For-the readers familiar 
with the notation of fuzzy-set this definition can be translated in a very simple form: 
(f(p) and (g<p) are fuzzy-sets over the set W of all formulas of the form V(a, i, s). 
(To find some information about fuzzy-sets see, e.g. [6] or [14].) 
Clearly, if Out0 <p contains all the formulas for which (fcp) takes the value 1 and 
In0 cp contains all the formulas for which (gcp) takes the value 1, then the pair <ouf0 cp, 
In0 <p> describes precisely all the necessary or deterministic consequences of action 
<p and for other formulas the value (fcp) (V(a, i, s) expresses the probability that 
V(a, i, s) was valid before the application of cp and it is not valid now (analogously 
for (gcp) (V(a, i, s)). If there is a formula V(a, i, s) <£ Out0 cp, for which (fcp) 
(V(a, i, sj) = 1, or V(a, i, s) $ In0 cp and (gcp) (V(a, i, s)) = 1, then the pair (Out0 cp, 
In0 cp} does not describe precisely nor the deterministic consequences of action cp. 
The non-probabilistic approach, e.g. that of STRIPS (as mentioned above) is, simply, 
a special example of our approach, namely if (fcp) is the characteristic function of 
Out0 cp and (gcp) is the characteristic function of In0 cp, i.e. (fcp) (V(a, i, s)) = 0, 
if V(a, i, s) £ Out0 cp, (gcp){V(a, i, s)) = 0, if V(a, i, s) i In0 cp. 
Before describing in details the sets Cond cp, Out0 cp and In0 cp for particular 
actions cp e si we must come to an agreement how to describe the set of all formulas 
the validity of which is storaged in a particular situation. The set of all formulas 
which are valid in situation s and whose validity is known or can be verified by the 
automaton on the base of its storage contain will be denoted by H(s). This mearis, 
that H(s) contains formulas of the form V(a, i, s') obtained from some observations, 
contained in In0 cp of an action cp which has been applied, deduced from another for-
mulas e.t.c. Here s' may be any situation, i.e. H(s) contains formulas of various 
"age"; "actualization" of these formulas to the actual situation s can be done by the 
frame deduction rule as will be described later. Moreover, H(s) contains all the 
consequences of the formulas mentioned above for which the automaton is able to 
deduce that they follow from some others. What does mean "the automaton is able 
to deduce" may depend on the case, in general we suppose the automaton to have 
to its disposal a theorem prover enabling at least for some formulas following 
from others to prove this fact. In this case the set H(s) can be described by the use 
of a smaller set H0(s) c H(s) and the consequence operation Cn* corresponding to 
the actual theorem — prover being to our disposal in the way: 
H(s) = Cn*(H0(s)) c Cn(H0(s)) 
As can be easily seen the fact of consistency or inconsistency of the set H(s) does 
not depend on the way in which H(s) is described in the form Cn*(H0(s)). The same 
holds if we ask, whether there is a formula in H(s) which is not valid in the environ-
ment (inadequacy of H(s)). So we shall assume in this paper, for the sake of simplicity, 
that only the formulas contained in H(s) can be proved from H(s), i.e. that H0(s) = 
= H(s) and Cn* is the most trivial identity operation. The question how to sample, 
in practice, Cn* and H0(s) is very important from the point of view of economization, 
however, this matter will not be investigated here. 
Let us finish this chapter by giving the form of the sets Cond0 cp and In0 cp for 
various g ie r f . The functions (fcp) and (gcp) may differ in various cases according 
to the actual conditions causing or involving the uncertainty of the automaton 
action, it is why we do not define them here. Some simplifying assumptions concerning 
(fcp) and (gcp) are introduced in Chapter 5. 
We assume to have in H(s) a special unary predicate describing the automaton 
position in a situation s. Let the Godel number of this predicate be I0, i.e. V(a, I0, s) 
means that in the situation s the automaton is in the point a e I2. At the beginning, i.e. 
in the situation s0, the automaton is supposed to be in <0, 0> and, moreover, it is 
supposed to know about it, i.e. 
V«0,0>,/0,s0)eH(s0) 
There are no more presumptions concerning the set H(s0), it may contain, of course, 
some more formulas given to it a priori. The automaton is also supposed to know, 
from the very beginning, the dependence axioms being to its disposal, however these 
axioms are not supposed to be in the sets H(s) and are not subjected to changes 
when s changes. 
We shall not investigate the most general situation and we adopt some assumptions 
for the sake of simplicity of the following reasoning. The moves and observations 
are supposed to be applicable in every case, i.e., there are no special conditions to 
which these actions should be subjected. For an operation cp the set Cond(cp) is sup-
posed to be one-element. 
Denote, for any a el2 : N(a) = <a t , a2 + 1>, NE(a) = <a t + 1, a2 + 1>, E(a) = 
= <flj + 1, a2),SE(a) = <a. + 1, a2 - l>,S(a) = <a t , a2 - l>,SW(a) = <a.. - 1, 
a2 - 1>, W(a) = <fll - 1, a2y, NW(a) = <f l l - 1, a2 + 1> (the sense should be 
clear), denote for any seS the point of/2, where the automaton is situated in the 
situation s, by R(s) (e.g. R(s0) = <0, 0>, R(NEs0) = <1, 1> etc.). Now, the sets 
Cond cp, Out cp and In cp for various actions follow (actions are supposed to be applied 
in a situation s e 5): 
(a) moves: For any move cp 
Cond(cp) = Out0(cp) = 0 (the empty set). 
In0(NE) = {V(NE(R(s)),I0,NEs)} , 
analogously for other moves. The intuitive sense is clear. 
(b) observations: Ob(a,j) 
Cond(Ob(a,j)) = 9, 
Out0(0b(a,j)) = {-] V(a,j,s)}, if V(a,j,s) is valid and ~| V(a, j , s) e H(s), 
Out0(0b(a,j)) = 0else, 
In0 (Ob(a,j)) = {V(a,j, Ob(a,j) s), V(R(s), I0, Ob(a,j) s)}, if V(a,j, s) is valid, 
In0(Ob(a,j)) = {V(R(s), I0, Ob(a,j)s)} else. 
Intuitively: Ob(a, j) means that the automaton observes, whether the point a el2 
possesses the j-th property. If the automaton is able to observe that it is the case, 
it puts V(a, j , s) into its storage and removes from it —I V(a, j , s) supposing this 
formula was in H(s). The fact that V(a,j, s) is not removed from H(s) supposing the 
automaton is not able to verify V(a,j, s) by the application of Ob(a,j) follows from 
the idea that the automaton failure to verify V(o, / , s) can be caused not only by 
non-validity of this formula, but also by limited means of observation. V(a, j , s) 
would be removed from H(s) if the observation Ob(a, k) (k is the Godel number 
of the negation of j - th property) were successful and V(a, k, s) were verified. 
(c) deductions: Ded(f, g, h, (au ..., a,,}, < i l s . . . , iB>, (su..., s„>) 
Cond0(Ded(f, g, h, (au ..., a„>, </., ..., /„>, <s„ ..., s„») = 
= {V(aJ,iJ,sJ),j = l,...,n}, 
Out0 (Ded(f,g,h,(au...,any,(iu...,iny,(su...,sn}) = 0 , 
In0 (Ded(f,g, h, <o lf ..., a„>, </,, ..., /„>, <s1; . . . , s „» = 
{V(f(au...,an),g(iu...,in), % , . . . , s„)), 
V(R(s),I0, Ded(f, g, h, <a1; ..., a„>, <{., ..., /„>, <s„ ..., s„» s)} . 
(d) operations: Op(j, k) 
Cond(Op(j,k)) = {V(R(s),j,s)}, 
Out0(OP(j,k)) ={V(R(s),j,s)}, 
In0 (Op(j, k)) = { V(R(s), I0, Op(j, k) s), V(R(s), k, Op(j, k) s)} . 
This means: If the point in which the automaton is situated possesses the j-th property, 
then Op(j, k) is applicable and, when applied, the point will posses the fc-th property. 
The fact that V(R(s), j , s) is removed does not mean that this formula is not more 
valid, it is possible that in the situation Op(j, k) s the point R(s) possesses both the 
j-th and the fc-th properties, however, we are not justified to claim it in general. 
In all the cases mentioned above the presence of the formula V(R(s), I0, q>s) in In0 <p, 
where cp is not a move, is necessary to express explicitly that during an observation, 
deduction or operation the automaton is supposed not to change its position in I2. 
It would be possible to remove, in all the cases, the formula V(R(s), I0, s) from H(s), 
as the sequence of automaton positions in I2, from s till the actual situation (ps can 
be extracted from cps. I.e., in all the cases above we could, instead of Out0 cp, consider 
the set Out0(pKj {V(R(s), I0, s)}. 
From the point of view of storage space saving this may be useful and important, 
but from the point of view of consistency or adequancy of H(s), which is dominant 
in this paper, this difference is irrelevant. 
For all action the new set H is defined: 
H(<ps) = (H(s) — Out0(q>)) u In0 (cp), cpe stf,cp applied in seS . 
In order to simplify our position we shall suppose, in all the rest of this paper, 
that if (p is a move, an observation or a deduction, then (fcp) is the characteristic 
function of Out0 (cp) and (gcp) is the characteristic function of In0 (cp). On the other 
hand, if cp is an operation, then we suppose that for any V(a, i, s) e iV 
(ftp) (V(a, i, s)) > 0 , (gcp) (V(a, i, s)) > 0 . 
I.e. only operations can have some unexpected consequences, but if an operation 
is applied, then any property of any point has a positive probability to occur in 
Out (cp) or in In (cp). Of course, there are some properties of points which cannot 
change, e.g. tautological properties, which are always valid or contradictory pro-
perties, which are never valid. This situation can be described in our model in such 
a way that formulas V(a, i, s), corresponding to such properties, occur or do not 
occur simultaneously in Out (cp) and In (<p) and both the cases have positive pro-
babilities. Here Out (cp) and In (<p) are random sets describing the formulas which 
cease to be valid or began to be valid in particular cases, i.e. Out (<p) and In (cp) 
contain also the random consequences of cp. 
The assumptions introduced above represent an important simplification of our 
basic general model and it is possible to construct automaton-environment systems 
for which these simplifications are not justified. However, it would be very difficult 
and maybe impossible to bring some analytical and numerical results, which we 
intend to bring in Chapter 5, for the most general model. We hope, that even including 
the introduced simplifications our model represents an interesting alternative to the 
usual deterministic model. These simplifications, moreover, do not influence, in deci-
sive way, the problems concerning the consistency and adequacy of the formal 
representation, which will be investigated below. 
3. FRAME DEDUCTION RULE 
When describing the possible actions of the automaton we have introduced a spe-
cial type of automaton activity which will be called actualization. It is caused by the 
fact that this activity cannot be described by a triple <[Cond cp, Out cp, In <p> as the 
actions, mentioned above, nor in case these sets are supposed to be of fuzzy nature 
as we supposed in the foregoing chapter. The reason is the following: the actualization 
can be applied only if some formula or formulas are not valid in the actual situation. 
As far no problem occurs, because the non-validity of a formula can be written as 
the validity of its negation, however, if the validity of a formula can be proved only 
by finding this formula in H(s), then the non-validity would be provable only by 
finding the negation of the checked formula in H(s) and this would be too weak condi-
tion for our purposes. So we are forced, as will be shown later, to formalize the 
conditions of actualization operation in such a way that actualization is applicable 
if certain formula or formulas does or do not occur in H(s) — and this condition 
cannot be expressed in the form Cond (p, described above. Before giving the details 
we would like to remark that this actualization operation is very close to the UNLESS 
— operator introduced by Sandewall in [12]. We shall see that difficulties connected 
with both the operations are very similar, namely they both can lead to the inconsis-
tency of a system to which they are added as a new deduction rule. However, our 
probabilistic approach enables to admit this possibility supposing its probability 
is not "to great" in certain sense. 
The frame deduction rule, enabling the procedure of actualization is suggested 
in this chapter as a way how to solve or avoid the so called frame axioms problem. 
This problem can be roughly described as follows: 
The sets of formulas Out cp, In (p (Out0 cp, In0 cp in our probabilistic approach) 
describe explicitly what changes in the environment when action cp applied. In 
practice, when an action is described in this way, we usually suppose, without special 
mentioning, that everything else, not mentioned explicitly in Out cp or In cp is the 
same as before also in the new situation resulting from the foregoing one by applica-
tion of the action in question. For example, if it is not mentioned explicitly, that an 
object changes its colour during an action of the automaton, the colour of that 
object is supposed not to be subjected to any change when the situation changes. 
Formally, if for an object a e I2 V(a, i, s) holds, then also V(a, i, cps) holds. However, 
to be able to joint also V(a, i, <ps) with H(<ps) we should be forced to have to our 
disposal a large number of axioms, connected with every action and expressing 
explicitly the fact that nothing not having been mentioned in Out <p and In <p is 
subjected to a change. These axioms, introduced for the first time in [4] and called 
here frame axioms are usually too numerous to be acceptable as a part of the formal 
representation of the environment. The problem how to avoid this difficulty is called 
frame axiom problem. A description of this problem and a brief survey of some 
solutions, their advantages and disadvantages can be found in [5]. 
Our idea can be called "principle of conservation" or "stability presumption" 
and consists in this way of reasoning: we suppose that a property of a point valid 
in some past situation has not changed if we have no explicit information about 
such a change. This means that if a formula V(a, i, s') e H(s), s' < s and if 
there is no formula V(a, i, s") in H(s), s' < s" < s, such that V(a, i, s') & Va, i, s") 
is a contradiction (i.e. the Godel number of this formula belongs to Deg). then 
V(a, i, s) is also supposed to be valid and is joined with H(s). 
To describe this rule in a form applicable to our purposes we must take into 
consideration that the automaton is not supposed to be able to decide, for any 
contradictory formula V(a, i, s') & V(a, i, s") that it is actually a contradiction. There 
is just a subset D0 c Deg such that the formulas with Godel numbers ftom D0 
can be tested to be contradictory. According to our assumption that only the formulas 
being in H(s) are derivable from H(s) we shall suppose that the automaton is able 
to find that V(a0, /, s") contradicts to V(ai, i, s') only if V(a0, i, s") is just the negation 
of V(ai, i, s') and a, = a0. Now, the frame deduction rule can be described as follows: 
Definition 3.1. Frame deduction rule sounds: If V(a, i, s')eH(s), s' < s and if 
for no s", s' < s" < s(s', s", s eS) 1 V(a, i, s") e H(s), then V(a, i, s) can be joined with 
H(s). An application of frame deduction rule is called actualization and denoted Act 
(a, i, s', s). 
Denote 
s/' = s4 u {Act (a, i, s', s), a e I2, i eN, s', seS} 
the elements of s4' will be called steps, so step is either an action ar an actualization. 
As already mentioned the frame deduction rule stands very close to Sandewall's 
UNLESS operator in its basic idea that the condition for application of such a rule 
is non-validity of certain formula. However, our frame deduction rule does not suffer 
from logical and philosophical difficulties connected with UNLESS-operator and 
mentioned briefly in [12]. It is caused by the fact that the negative condition for 
application of the frame deduction rule is not of the form that a formula must not 
be derivable, the only request is that it has not been derived (from observations or 
other formulas) until the moment the rule is to be applied. On the other hand, our 
frame deduction rule as well as the UNLESS-operator do not possess the extension 
property possessed by all the deduction rules in usual formalized theorirs. This 
property consists in fact that enlarging the set of premises the set of their con-
sequences is also larger or at least the same. Clearly, when using the frame deduction 
rule it is possible that, joining a new formula with the set of premises a formula, 
having been derivable before, will not be more derivable. A more careful and 
detailed investigation of the deduction rules of this type seems to be very interesting 
and justified from the point of view of "pure" mathematical logic as well as from 
the point of view of their various applications, however, such an investigation is 
beyond the limits of this paper. 
In the foregoing chapter we described all the actions which the automaton is 
supposed to be able to perform, in this chapter we enriched the list of the automaton 
abilities by a new one — actualization. We also investigated in which form the appli-
cation of particular steps is reflected in the automaton formal representation of the 
world. 
However, the common interaction between the automaton and the environment is 
not an individual event, it is a process. From the side of the automaton this means 
that its behaviour is described by a sequence of actions, not by a particular action. 
Consequently, the automaton must be supposed not only to perform a particular 
step but also to decide, after performing a step, which one should be the next. 
There are two main aspects influencing the choosing of the next step. First, the 
automaton is given some goal and its aim is to change the state of the environment 
in such a way, using the operations, that the goal should be reached. The other aspect 
is given by the fact that the automaton takes into consideration the information 
about the environment being at its disposal, i.e. the set H(s). We recall that thanks 
to a formula of the type V(a, I0, s) (or more formulas of this type) being always 
contained in H(s) the automaton has at its disposal the complete information about 
its behaviour since the beginning situation s0. 
The decision taken by the automaton about its next step can be seen as plan-
making activity of the automaton. In general, it is possible to distinguish two forms 
of planning — one — step planning, when the automaton chooses just the next step 
and more — step planning, when the automaton decides to perform a finite sequence 
of steps and as late as after their performing its chooses again what to do now. It is 
also possible to admit that the automaton chooses at least some of the next steps 
on a random base, it means on the base of a random experiment (compare with the 
so called mixture strategies in game theory, e.g. in [1]). The notion of the action 
random function of the automaton, as introduced below, seems to be general enough 
to cover all these possibilities. 
Definition 3.2. Let (Q, SP, P) be a probability space, let Fin (if) be the set of all 
finite subsets of the set •W (let us recall that "W is the set of all formulas of the form 
V(a, i, s), a e I2, i e N, seS). Then action random function M of the automaton is 
a mapping from the Cartesian product Fin (W) x Q into the set s#' of steps such 
that for all X e Fin {W) the mapping M(X, .) is a random variable, i.e. for any 
{co:M(X,co) = r}e£f . 
Supposing, there is, for any X e Fin (iV) an /• = r(X) e #J' such that 
(3.1) P({co : M(X, co) = r(X)}) = 1 , 
then M is called action function of the automaton. The demand (3.1) can be replaced 
by a slightly stronger one, namely 
(3.2) M(X, co) = r(X) for all co e Q . 
(3.1) as well as (3.2) express the fact that the next step of the automaton is determi-
nistically (or at least with the probability 1) given when known the image H(s) of the 
environment being at automaton disposal in a situation. 
In our approach all the automaton capability to search for the goal, to choose 
subgoals, to make appropriate plans etc. is hidden somehow in the action (random) 
function M. This description seems to be very general and in an actual situation 
it really will be, however, as will be shown below, for our reasons this approach 
seems to be quite justifiable. Our intention is to model somehow (namely by the use 
of random walks) the automaton behaviour as seen from the point of view of an 
external observer, observing only what the automaton does do and which is its 
formal representation of the environment. The observer does not know and is not 
interested in the internal automaton activity and neglects it supposing his model of 
automaton behaviour is, in a sense, "good enough" to describe the external features 
of the automaton behaviour and to enable to the observer to make some conclusions 
and hypotheses concerning the automaton (e.g. its future moves, actions or beha-
viour). We ask the reader to keep in mind this remark because its aim is to serve as an 
intuitive justification of our further way of reasoning. 
First of all we shall suppose that properties of points in I2 are random events. 
This assumption does not mean that somebody makes random experiments and, 
according to their results, defines the properties of points. We would like just to say, 
that we do not know the properties of points a priori and that we consider the pro-
babilistic apparatus to be appropriate for expressing this ignorance. Formally, let 
us consider a mapping ~f~ defined on the Cartesian product I2 x N x S x Q and 
taking its values in two-element set {truth, false} such that for any fixed a e I2, i e N, 
seS the mapping i^(a, i, s, .) is a random variable, i.e. 
(3.3) {co : r(a, i, s, co) = true} e S* . 
The random event in (3.3.) is that one consisting in the fact that the point a el2 
posseses, in the situation s, the i-th property. Of course, for different t r i p l e s ^ , it, s t>, 
(a2, i2, s2> the random variables V(au it, su .) and V(a2, i2, s2, .) need not to be 
independent, in fact our dependence axioms described just the situation when the 
dependence among those random variables is of deterministic nature and various 
types of statistical dependence are not excluded as well. 
This assumption involves the following consequence. If, e.g. the observation 
Ob (a,j) is to be executed in a situation s, then the fact, whether V(a,j, s) is joined 
with H (Ob (a, j) s) or not is a random event, as it dependens on the value taken 
by °T(a, i, s). Hence, the set H(s) is, in general, a random set, which can be formally 
described as a value taken by a random variable H, defined on (Q, if, P) and taking 
its values in Fin (#"). Moreover, as the next action of the automaton, given by the 
action (random) function M depends on H(s) = H(s, co), also this next action or step 
can be considered to be a value of an appropriate random variable. Finally, the situa-
tion s, being a finite sequence of steps, depends also on co, so we can write s(co) and 
H(s(co), CO) instead of s and H(s). The fact, that the sets si', S and Fin (if) are count-
able assures the correctness of what we have just said and justifies our intention to 
work only within the scope of discrete probability distributions. We can also define, 
for any xe si', the real p(x) as follows: 
(3.4) p(x) = P({co : M(H(s(co), co), co) = X}). 
The countability of Fin (#") and $f' and the factorization proves the correctness 
of this definition. Hence, p(x) is the probability, in general, that the step x e / will 
be applied. Now, we shall assume that this probability is the same and positive in 
every case and in every situation and that the probabilities of steps in different 
situations are statistically independent. Said in other word, we assume that the auto-
maton behaviour can be considered to be a sequence of random samples, mutually 
independent and equally distributed, sampling and performing steps from s/' with 
respect to the probability distribution p(x), x e si?'. Formally, the automaton beha-
viour is described by a random variable a, defined on the probability space (fi, Sf, P) 
and taking its values in si' supposing the following two conditions are satisfied: 
(3.5) for any seS : s = s(co) = a„(co) a„_!((»), ..., a2(co) ax(co) s0 , 
where a,-, i = 1, 2 , . . . , are copies of the random variable a, (3.6.) for any s = 
= cpncpn^1, ..., cp2cp1s0 eS holds: 
P({co : s(co) = .}) = f [ P({co : M(H(Si^(co), co), to) = Vl}) = f[ p(cp^, cpt e s4', 
i=i i = i 
i = 1, 2, ..., n. 
For any situation seS define lh(s) as follows: 
lh(s0) = 0 , 
lh(cps) = lh(s) + 1 , seS , cpest'. 
This gives that for s = cp1cp2, ..., cp„s0 lh(s) = n. 
Theorem 3.1. Consider an automaton-environment system described above. Let 
aeI2,ieN be such that in every situation s the automaton is able to decide whether 
V(a, i, s) is valid or not. Let be I2 be, a. point having the i-th property just if a has 
(i.e. the automaton is able to derive, using a dependence axiom, V(b, i, s) from 
V(a, i, s) and ~| V(b, i, s) from ~| V(a, i, s)). Let there be at least one operation, 
let no operation changes the i-th property. Let all the dependence axioms be limited. 
Then, if a + b, 
P({co : Cn(H(s(co), co)) = W} \ {co : 7/i(s(co)) ^ 5}) > 0 . 
Remark. Intuitively said, the theorem sounds: If the automaton performs at least 
five steps, then there is a positive probability that its formal representation of the 
environment is inconsistent. 
Proof . The assumption that p(x) > 0 for any xe si' and (3.6) give that 
P({co : s(co) = s}) > 0 
for any s e S. Hence, our theorem will be proved supposing we find, for any n >. 5 
a situation s with lh(s) = n and such that H(s, co) is inconsistent. 
192 Consider the following steps £t,...., £6: 
{..: ofc(a, /, s0). Here we may suppose that V(a, /, s0) holds (if not, take instead 
of i the Godel number of the negation of the i-th property, say neg(i)). This gives 
that V(a, i, s0) e H(^s0). 
£2: Ded (f, g, h, <a>, </>, <s0>), where </, g, h> is the dependence axiom enabling 
to transpose the i-th property from a to b. This dependence axiom is applicable and 
V(b, i, s0) enters the set H(^2<^1s0). 
£3: Ac/(fe, /, s0, sx), where 
st = Op(k, I) c22,s0 . 
Hence, V(b, i, st) e H(t,2^iSo), as the actualization may be performed. 
£4: Any- operation op (k, I) such that {fc, /} n {/, neg (/)} = 0. With a positive 
probability, namely (g Op (k, I)) (V(a, neg (/), {2{iso))>
 n o w t n e formula V(a, neg (/), 
^2^iso) is valid. Which formula or formulas enter the set H^^c^So) is irrelevant, 
our assumptions assure that none of the formulas V(a, i, s0), V(b, i, s0), V(b, /, st) 
is removed from H(^3^iS0). £5 = Ob (a, neg (/)): Consider the case mentioned 
in the foregoing step, that V(a, neg (/), £4<!;2f is0) holds. Then V(a, neg (/), <^4^2 îs0) 
enters H(£5£4£2£tSo). 
^6 = Ded(f,g, h, <a>, <neg />, <^2{i
so>)- This dependence axiom be applied 
and V(b, neg (/), ^2^s0) occurs in HfatsZdzZi«o)- However, V(b, /, Sj) e 
e H(£6£5£4£2£2s0) as well and, because st = £4£2£is0, the set H(^5^2^s0) is 
proved to be inconsistent. Nowe because of the fact that all the dependence axioms 
are limited, and there is only a finite number of such axioms, there exists an integer 
R0 such that any instance Ded(f, g, h, <a«, ..., a„>, </x,..., /„>, <s1;..., s„>) of any 
dependence axiom, containing at least one a;, j ^ k, such that \aji\ + |aj2| > R, 
is just of the trivial form. 
(3.7) [V(au iu Sl) & V(a2, i2, s2) & ... & V(a„, /„, s„)] -+ V(ak, ik, jk) , j^n. 
Therefore, for any n ^ 5 we can take the situation s„, 
sn = <Pn-5(Pn-6<Pn-7, •••» ' ^ f l ^ ^ S ^ ^ ^ S o > 
where ^o;, / _ n — 5, are "trivial" deductions of the type (3.7). These deductions 
do not change the set H, hence 
H(sn) = HfaZsMitiSo) • 
With the probability 
(gU)(V(a,neg(i), ^ 1 s 0 ) ) > 0 , 
this set is inconsistent; with the probability 
( n W i ) ) rifc) K«)s K«*) Kfc) p{^) K«0 > ° 
J = I 
the relation 193 
H(s(co)) = H(s„) 
holds under the condition that Ih (s(co)) = n. This proves, that if Ih (s((o)) ^ 5, then 
there is a positive probability that H(s(a>)) is inconsistent. The theorem is proved. 
The construction leading to an inconsistent formal representation may seem to be 
rather artificial and the assumptions rather special. It would be possible to find 
another sequences of actions leading to inconsistent H(s), may be more closely to the 
real positions. However, it is not the aim of the foregoing theorem to do it. There 
are the two following important aspects of the theorem, namely 
(a) The possibility of inconsistency is proved. As an inconsistent formal representa-
tion is useless (at least from the usual point of view which we adopt here; we do not 
take into consideration the so called quasi-consistent theories, see, e.g. [11]), we are 
forced to do something if this representation is inconsistent. Or, accepting a statistical 
approach, we must be sure that the probability of such an inconsistency is small 
enough to be acceptable. 
(b) Notice the interesting fact that using only the formulas V(a, i, s'), resulting 
from observations contained in H(s) we are not able to say which of the two contra-
dictory formulas proved to be in H(s) is valid, as both of them result from foregoing 
deductions, none of them is a direct result of an observation. The reader may 
remember that when the negation of an observation was in H(s), this negation was 
removed from H(s) and the observation was joined, i.e. the automaton prefers the 
observations to hypotheses deduced from other formulas. Nevertheless, the theorem 
proves that such a selection does not save from inconsistency. This gives that the 
problem of inconsistency of the set H(s) is rather deep and deserves a more detailed 
investigation. To this goal Chapter 5 of this paper will be devoted and we shall profit 
from our assumption that the automaton behaviour can be modeled by a probability 
distribution on the set $£' of steps. This assumption, together with other ones, give 
us the idea to use the notion of random walk and the apparatus being at the disposal 
of this field or probability theory to our purposes. For this sake we explain in the 
next chapter some notions and results concerning the random walks and we shall 
also prove some assertions being useful for us in the following part of this paper. 
4. MODIFIED RANDOM WALKS 
The notion of random walk is one among the most important in this work because 
of our aim to simulate by an appropriate random walk the position changes of our 
automaton, i.e. its movements in two dimensional discrete space. This chapter gives 
some information about random walks necessary for our purposes. Some elementary 
explanation of this subject can be found in [2], the reader demanding a more detailed 
study can be referred to [13] or to another monography of this kind. 
194 The expression "random walk" is connected with the following intuitive idea (we 
consider first the one-dimensional case): a particle is situated in a point on the real 
line. This point is supposed to have an integer coordinate, i.e. its position is described 
by an integer. 
The particle has a possibility to change its position; in every step it changes its 
position and goes to one of the two neighbour points with integer coordinates. 
Which of the two possibilities occurs — it is a random event; with probability q the 
particle moves to the left, with the probability p = 1 - q it moves to the right. 
This probabilities are supposed to be constant during the random walk and the 
movements in different steps are supposed to be mutually independent. 
Suppose that the particle is situated in the point z > 0, let there exist barriers 
in the points 0 and a > z. Denote by qz the probability that the particle reaches, 
sooner or later, the left barrier (in 0) not having reached, before, the right one in a, 
by p. denote the probability that the particle reaches the right barrier not having 
reached, before, the left one. Then the following assertions are valid: 
(4-1) gz + p , = 1 , 
(4.2) i f , * , , then 9z = W ~ -!-£, 
W P f - 1 
(4.3) if p = q = 1/2, then qz = I - -
a 
(proofs can be found in [2]). 
Let p0, pu ... be a discrete probability distribution, i.e. every p; 2: 0 and £ p ; = 1. 
Clearly, the series i = 0 
P(s) = £ P, • sl 
i = 0 
converges at least if — 1 :g s |a 1. The function P(s) is called creative function of the 
probability distribution p0, p{, .... Clearly, having to our disposal P(s) we are able 
to derive p ; using the formula 
(44) "4[s'wL 
So the creative function represents a very simple and a very concentrated representa-
tion of the probability distribution in question even if an explicit and numerical 
calculation of particular values p;'may be sometimes a rather peculiar matter. It is 
why we shall limit ourselves, sometimes, to the deriving of the creative function. 
Denote by uzn the probability that the particle, starting in the point z comes, at 
the n-th step, for the first time to the point 0 not having come before the point a. 
Consider the creative function 
(4.5) UZ(S) = fX , . s
f . 
This function can be expressed as follows. Denote 
A l ( a )--l±il-




then the relation 
1 ; U W (h(s))°-(Us)Y 
is valid (c.f. [2]). 
The case a = oo is not excluded, in this case the movement of the particle in the 
right direction is not limited. In this case can be proved that 
(4.7) Uz(s) = (A2(s))*. 
The probability that the particle reaches the point 0 is for a = oo equal to 1 if q = p 
and is equal to (qjp)z if q < p. 
For our reasons we need a slight modification of the above concept of random 
walk. We shall admit also the possibility that the particle may rest at the same posi-
tion in a particular step, i.e. that it does not move. Hence, this modified random walk 
is described by three non-negative reals p, p0, q, p0 + p + q = 1, such that p 
represents the probability of the move to the right, q that to the left and p0 is the 
probability that the particle does not move. 
Theorem 4.1. Consider a random walk described by the triple <p, p0, q) with 
no barriers. Let the particle be situated in 0. Then the probability that the particle 
leaves 0 in the first step and will never return back equals to \p — tjl. 
Proof . In the first step there are three following possibilities. First, the particle 
rests in 0 with the probability p0. Second, it moves to 1 and, maybe, returns to 0 
eventually. This return has the probability equal to 1, if q — p or equal to qjp, 
if q < p. This results from foregoing results, setting z = I, as our particle returns 
to 0 if and only if it returns to 0 supposing it is subjected to usual random walk with 
probabilities p/(l — p0), q\(\ — p0). Third, it moves to — 1 , but this case can be 
transformed into the foregoing one changing the roles played by p and q. So, denoting 
by D the probability that the particle will be in 0 sometimes in future, we obtain: 
D = p0 + p + q(pjq), if q = p , 
D = p0 + q + p(qjp), if q < p , 
i.e., in both the cases 
D = p0 + 2 min [p, q) = 1 - \p - q\ 
which proves the theorem. 
196 Theorem 4.2. Consider the same situation as in the foregoing theorem. Denote by 
u. the probability that the particle will be, at the n-th step, for the first time 
again in 0. Then the creative function U(s) of these probabilities satisfies: 
(4.8) Us = p0s + «-*[(! - Pos) - ((1 - p0)
2 - Apqs2y2_ . 
Proof . Clearly u0 = 0, uL = p0. If the particle is situated in a point z > 0 and 
is subjected to the modified random walk with probabilities p, p0, q then the pro-
bability uz„ of the first reaching of 0 satisfies the difference equation, 
(4.9) uz_n+1 = puz+Un + qz-ltn + p0uzn . 
Multiplying the both sides by s"+1 and summing we obtain 
(4.10) U,(s) = ps Uz+1(s) + qs U._x(s) + p0s Uz(s) 
and this equality can be transformed into the form 
(4.11) Uz(s) = - ? L - Uz+l(s) + ^ _ _ _ Uz_i{s) 
1 - p0s 1 - p0s 
similar to that derived in [2] for the case of usual random walk. Applying the same 
methods and reasonings as in [2] we derive that in the case a = oo Uz(s) satisfies: 
(4A2) U2(s) = [(i - PoS) o - ^ ) - ( ( i - ^ - w ( i - ^ r j . 
At the very beginning the particle is in 0. If it moves to 1, the probabilities of its 
coming back to 0 are described by the creative function just described setting z = 1. 
If the particle moves to — 1, the probabilities of its coming back to 0 is described 
by the creative function U.(s) for z = 1, where U',(s) results from U,(s) by changing 
the roles of p and q. Hence, the creative function U(s) satisfies: 
U(s) = p U,(s) + q U;(s) + Po(s) . 
After an easy calculation we find that 
U(s) = Po + s "
] [ ( l - Pos) - ((1 - p0s)
2 - 4pqs2y2_' 
which completes the proof. 
Considering a usual random walk with probabilities p and q, with barriers in 0 
and a and with the starting point of the particle in z, 0 < z < a, we have mentioned 
that the creative function of the probabilities of coming to 0 is given by (4.6) if 
a < oo and by (4.7) if a = co. It is possible to prove that the probability uz„ satis-
fies: 
(4.13) wZi„ = a"
1 2"p ("- z ) / 2fl ("+ z ) / 2Xcosn-1 (nvfl-1) sin (TIVO"1) sin (nzva"1) 
v = 1 
if a < oo 
and 
(4.14) «z?„ = 2V
n""z)/2g(" + z , / 2 cos"-1 KX sin Jtx sin nzx dx if a = oo . 
Any modified random walk can be considered as a usual one if we consider only 
the actual moves to be steps. This gives that to n steps of the modified random 
walk corresponds a random number m = m(co) moves of the usual random walk 
and, clearly, the probability that m(co) = i, i :g n, is equal to 
(1 - Po)1 Po~' • 
Hence, denoting by u (z, n, a, p, p0, q) the probability that a particle, subjected 
to a modified random walk with probabilities p, p0 and q, with barriers in 0 and a and 
starting from a point z between 0 and a will come to 0 in the n-th step, we can clearly 
obtain 
u(z, n, a, p, p0 , q) = ]T / " j (l - Po)' p'0~'u(z, i, a, p \ 1 - p0, 0, q \ 1 - p0), 
namely 
u(z, n, oo, p, p0, q) = £ ( " ) (1 - Poy p0"' 2''. 
Po V" " ' V Q 
1 - Í V \ 1 - Po 
= o \ . 
(« + --)/2 f l 
cos" ] л.\- sin лx sin лzx dx . 
Let us recall that u(z, n, oo, p, p0, q) are, for n = 0, 1, 2,.. ., coefficients in the expo­
nential development of (4.12) and, if p0 = 0, then u(z, n, a, p, 0, q) are coefficients 
in the exponential development of (4.6) or (4.7), i.e. u(z, n, a, p, 0, q) is given by 
(4.13) or (4.14) respectively. 
From this follows that the probability of coming back to 0 for an unlimited random 
walk starting from 0 (denoted in the last theorem by u„ or, more precisely, un(p, p0,q)) 
satisfies: 
"»(/>> Po, q) = Po + 
" /n\ / n \((-D/- / n \('+D/-
cos' l тux(sin тrx)2 dx + 
cos'~ ł тtx(sin лx)2 dx = p0 H £ 2 ' . 
o 1 ~ Po i = 1 
) cos' * x(sin тtx)2 dx . 
v(l - Po) ) J o 
In the following part of this paper we shall use only the expressions u„(p, p0, q) 
or u(z, n, a, p, p0, q) (if a is omitted, always it means that a = oo). All the further 
reasonings and computations will be done only in the terms of these probabilities 
and without their detailed explicit developing. Various methods how to compute 
or estimate these probabilities are purely a matter of random walks theory and will 
not be investigated here. 
Keeping in mind our basic idea to model the automaton behaviour by an appro­
priate random walk we shall consider a particle subjected to two simultaneous random 
walks. We can see this situation as follows: the particle is situated in I2 and it can 
move, with certain probabilities, to any point in $j(a) or to stay in a. Denoting the 
corresponding probabilities by p(N), p(NE), ..., p(NW) we can easily see that the 
projection of the particle to the axe y can be understood as if it were subjected to the 
modified random walk with probabilities 
(4.15) (p(NW) + p(N) + p(NE), p0 + p(E) + p(W), p(SE) + p(S) + p(SW)> . 
At the same time, the projection of the particle to the axis x can be understood as if 
subjected to the modified random walk with probabilities 
(4.16) (p(NE) + p(E) + p(SE), p0 + p(N) + p(S), p(SW) + p(W) + p(NW)> . 
Here 
p0 = 1 - (p(N) + p(NE) + p(E) + p(SE) + p(S) + p(SW) + p(W) + p(NW)) 
denotes the probability that the particle does not move, considering the automaton 
it means that some other step than moving is applied. In the following we denote 
p = p(NW) + p(N) + p(NE), 
-o = Þo + P(E) + p(W), 
q =p(SE) + p(S) + p(SW), 
r = p(NE) + p(E) + p(SE), 
t-o = Po + P(N) + p(S), 
s = p(SW) + p(W) + p(NW), 
and we shall consider a particle subjected to two ortogonal and statistically indepen-
dent random walks with probabilities <p, p0, a> and <r, r0, s>. 
Definition 4.1. Let z el2, a el2, let p0, p, q, r0, r, s be non-negative reals such 
that p + p0 + q = r + r0 + s — 1. Define a real 
j„(z, a, R, p, p0 , a, r, r0, s) 
(R is a non-negative integer) as follows: 
(a) if \at — Zj| g R and |a2 - z2[ g R (i.e. z e 0R(a)), then 
(4A7) j0(z, a, R, p, p0, q, r, r0, s) = 1 , 
j„(z, a, R, p, p0, q, r, r0, s) = 0 , 
(in the following the parameters ofj„ are always the same and will not be explicitly 
repeated), 
(b) if \zt — at\ S R and a2 > z2 + R then 
(4.18) j„ = (1 - E [u(zx - a t + R - l , i, 2R + 2, p, Po, q) + 
i= 1 
+ u(at — z. + R — 1, i, 2R + 2, q, Po, p)]) u(a2 - z2 — R, n, oo, s, r0, r) 
(c) if \zt — at\ ^ R and z2> a2 + R, then 
(4.19) j„ = (1 - £ [u(z, - a i + R - i , i, 2R + 2, p, Po, q) + 
i= 1 
+ u(at - zt + R - 1, i, 2R + 2, q, p0, p)~\) u(z2 - a2 - R, n, oo, r,r0,S) 
(d) if |z2 - a2\ ^ R and at > zx + R, then 
(4.20) j„ = (1 - £ [w(z2 - a2 + R - 1, i, 2R + 2, r, r0, s) + 
i= 1 
+ u(a2 - z2 + R - l,2R + 2,s, r0, r)]) u(a{ - z, - R, n, oo, a, p0, p), 
(e) if |z2 — a2| ^ R and zt > ay + R, then 
(4.21) j„ = (1 - £[M (z 2 - a2 + R - 1, i, 2R + 2, r, r0, s) + 
i = i 
+ u(a2 — z2 + R — 1, i, 2R + 2, s, r0, r)]) ..(zj - a, — R, n, oo, p, p0 , q) 
(f) if z, < a, — JR and z2 < a2 - R, then 
(4.22) j„ = M(a, — z, — R, n, oo, g, p0 , p) u(a2 — z2 - R, n, oo, s, r0, r ) , 
(g) if z, > a, + R and z2 < a2 — R, then 
(4.23) j„ = M(Z, — a, — R, n, oo, p, p0, g) M(a2 - z2 — R, n, oo, s, r0, r ) , 
(h) if z, > a, + P and z2> a2 + R, then 
(4.24) j„ = M(Z, — at - R, n, oo, p, p0, q) u(z2 — a2 — R, n, oo, r, r0 ,S) , 
(i) if z, < a, — P and z2 > a2 + P, then 
(4.25) j„ = M(O, — z, - P, n, oo, a, p0 , p) M(Z2 — a2 — R, n, oo, r, r0, s) . 
Theorem 4.3. Consider a particle subjected to the two-dimensional modified 
random walk with the probabilities p0, p(N), p(NE), p(E), p(S£), p(S), p(SW), 
p(W) and p(NW), let the probabilities (,p, p0, g> and <r, r0, s> define the two 
one-dimensional modified random walks resulting when the considered two-dimen-
sional random walk projected the two axes. Denote by P„(z, a, R, <p, p0, q}, <r, r0,s}) 
the probability that the particle, starting from z e I2 enters in the n-th step for the 
first time the set <5R(a), aeI
2,ReN. Then 
PB(z, a, R, <p, p0, q>, <r, r0, s » ^ j„(z, a, P, p, p0, q, r, r0, s ) . 
Proof . Let j„ be defined according to (4.17). Then z e GR (a) hence P„ = 1 if 
n = 0 and P„ = 0 otherwise, so the assertion holds. Let f„ be defined according 
to (4.18). Here, z, e <a, - R,a2 + P> and M(Z, - a, + P - 1, i, 2R + 2, p, p0, q) 
is nothing else than the probability that the projection of the particle on the axis x 
reaches a, — P — 1 in the z'-th step not having reached before the point a, + P + 1. 
Here we use the fact that when a random walk considered, the corresponding pro-
babilities are the same in case the barriers are in 0 and a and starting position in z 
as in the case the barriers are in K and a + K and starting position in z + K. To 
find the probability of reaching the right barrier (a, + P + 1 in our case) we can 
notice that it is just the probability of reaching the left barrier when p replaced by q, 
q by p and z by a — z. This way of reasoning gives that 
M(Z, - a, + P - 1, i, 2R + 2, p, p0, q) + u(at - z, + P - 1, j , 2P + 2, q, p0, p 
is just the probability that the projection of the particle on the axis x leaves in the 
i-th step for the first time the interval <a, — R,ax + P>. 
Using the same way of reasoning we obtain that u(a2 — z2 — R, n, oo, s, r0, r) 
is just the probability of the entering the y — projection of the particle into the 
interval <a2 — P , a2 + P> first time at the n-th step. Combining these results we 
have tha t / , , defined by (4.18), expresses the probability that the particle will never 
leave the belt defined by the interval <at — R, a, + R> and at the n-th step for the 
first time enters &R(a). This is a sufficient condition for the event the probability 
of which is denoted by P„, hence also in this case the assertion is valid. 
The validity of the assertion supposing/„ is defined according to (4.19), (4.20) 
or (4.21) follows from the same arguments as in the case (4.18) because of the evident 
symmetry of all the four cases, just the appropriate replacements among zL «-> au 
z2*-+ a2, g *-> p,r *-> s must be done. 
Suppose that /„ is defined according to (4.22). Here /„ expresses the probability 
that the x-projection of the particle reaches at the n-th step for the first time the 
point ax — R and, at the same time, the j-projection reaches for the first time a2 — R. 
This conjunction of events is, of course, sufficient for the first reaching of the particle 
the set 0R(a) at the n-th step, so the assertion holds again. Because of the symmetry 
also in the cases (4.23), (4.24) and (4.25) the assertion holds. The theorem is proved. 
Theorem 4.4. Let the conditions of Theorem 4.3 hold. If p = a, r = s, p0 < 1 
and r0 < 1 then 
)ZPn(z,a,R,(p,Po,qy, < r , r 0 , 5 » = 1 
n = 0 
else 
f Pn(z, a, R, <p, p0, q}, <r, r0, s » < 1 . 
n = 0 
Proof. It is a well-known fact (see [13]), that if p = q, r = s, p0 < 1 and r0 < 1 
(symmetric random walk), then with probability one the particle reaches, sooner 
or later, any point in I2. On the other hand, if these conditions are not satisfied, then 
there is for any point, excepting the starting one, a positive probability that the 
particle will never reach this point. Our theorem just expresses these facts using the 
terms of P„ which proves the theorem. 
With this theorem we finish this chapter and in the next one we return again to our 
investigation of automaton-environment systems from the point of view of the 
consistency of its internal formal representation of the environment. 
5. INCONSISTENCY AND INADEQUACY PROBABILITIES 
In this chapter a number of theorems is given with the aim to describe in more 
details the probability that the formal representation of the environment becomes 
inconsistent (positivity of this probability was proved in Theorem 3.1). In all this 
chapter we assume that the automaton can observe only the properties of the point 
where it is situated in the actual situation. Formally: p(Ob (a,j)) = 0 if V(a, I0, s) 
does not hold. 
Some more notation seems to be convenient: 
X = {N. NE, E, SE, S, SW, W, NW} , 
ifXeX, then X is the reverse move (i.e. N = S, NE = SW, E = W, etc.), 
f„(a, p, p0, q, r, r0, s) = £ p(X)fn(Xa, a, 0, p, p0, q, r, r0, s) 
XeX 
where f„(z, a, R, p, p0, q, r, r0, s) is the function defined in Definition 4.1, 
F(a, p, p0, q, r, r0, s) = £ z7"(a, p, p0, q, r, r0, s) . 
n = 0 
Theorem 5.1. Consider an automaton-environment system as described above. 
Denote by s the actual situation, by s' = s'(co) the situation following from s by 
applying n further steps (i.e. Ih (s') = Ih (s) + n). Then 
P({co : Cn(H(S'(co), co)) = W}) = 
= I E I {v(Ob(a,j) p(X) p(Op(k, /)) [a Op (k, I) (V(a, neg i, s"))] P(X). 
Op i XeX 
. 1 f [1 - (1 - p({5) p(Qf] \fn P(a, p, p0, q, r, r0, s)] } , 
n\ k=o ]_dzn J2 = 0J 
where £ denotes summation over all operations not influencing /-th and neg i-th 
op 
properties, J] denotes summation over all i such that "T(a, i, s, co) = true, s" denotes 
the situation resulting from s when Ob (a,j),X and Op (k, I) applied, £5 and £6 are 
the same as in Theorem 3.L The symbol a denotes the automaton position in the 
situation s. 
Proof . Automaton is in a and Ob(a,j) is applied, hence V(a,j,s) enters to 
H (Ob (a, j) s), as "V(a, i, s, co) = true. Then the automaton moves, e.g. to the 
north (i.e. X = N) and applies an operation Op (k, l). This operation involves a ran-
dom consequence consisting in fact that now V(a, neg i, s") holds. Then the auto-
maton moves back to a. All this sequence of actions is performed with the probability 
(5-1) P (Ob (a, j)) p(x) p(Op (k, 1)) p(X) . 
Multiplying this probability by (g Op (k, I)) (V(a, neg i, s")) we have the probability 
with which the automaton is again in a in situation s'" 
s'" = X Op(k,l)XOb(a,j)s, 
and in H(s'") is V(a, i, s), while V(a, i, s'") does not hold. Following the same way 
of reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 we find that if, now, £5 and £6 applied, 
H(s'") becomes to be inconsistent. If this does not occur, the same possibility occurs 
in every step which brings the automaton to the point a again. Hence, (1 — p(£s) 
p(£6))
k expresses the probability that H(s'") does not become inconsistent when the 
automaton for the /c-th time is in a and 1 — (1 — p(£s) p(%6))
k minorizes the pro-
bability that k enters of the automaton into a was sufficient for inconsistency of 
H(s'"). 
Now, F is the creative function of/,, where/ , is a lower bound for the probability 
of returning back to a in n steps. So Fk defines a lower bound for probabilities that 
the automaton k-times comes back to a. In other words, 
—, — **(-» P> "o. 9, r, r0, s) \_n\dz" J2 = 0 
minorizes the probability that in situation s' the automaton will be in a for at least 
k-th time counting from the situation s. Hence, 
(5-2) -}l [ i -a -Kc^Kai r^H 
n\ k=o |_dz Jz = o 
gives a lower bound for the probability that H(s') is inconsistent supposing the auto-
maton is in situation s'". Combining (5.1) and (5.2) and taking into consideration that 
the special choose of i, Op (k, I) and X, made when (5.1) derived is irrelevant we 
obtain just the assertion of the theorem. The theorem is proved. 
Theorem 5.2. Under the same conditions as in Theorem 5.1 
P({a> : Cn (H(s'(a>), a)) = #"}) S 
= 1 - E P(X) (1 - L(X0, 0, 0, p, p0, q, r, r0, S)) . 
XeX 
Proof . It is possible to suppose that the automaton is in <0, 0> in the situation s 
because the distribution p restricted to X is space-homogeneous. A necessary condi-
tion of inconsistency is that the automaton comes at least once back to 0. This 
probability is majorized by p(x). (1 — f„(X0, 0, 0, p, p0, q, r, r0, s)) supposing the 
move X is applied and is equal to 1 — ~~ p(X) supposing another step is applied. 
Hence, 
P({co : Cn(H(s'((o), to)) = if}) rg 1 - p(X) + £ p(X) (1 - / . ) = 
XeX 
= 1 - E K~0 (! - fn(X°> °> 0» P> -o, 1, r, r0, s)) 
XeX 
which proves the theorem. 
204 Theorem 5.3. Consider the same conditions as in Theorem 5.1. Let, moreover, 
p = q > 0 and r = s > 0. Then 
P({co : Cn(H(s'(co), co)) = 1<r}) -> 1 
if n = lh(s') - lh(s)-> oo. 
In another words: if the random walk modeling the automaton behaviour is 
symmetric and non-degenerate, then the formal representation of the environment 
becomes, sooner or later, inconsistent. 
Proof : The random event, consisting in the sequence <ob (a, j), X, Op (k, I); X} 
of steps together with the random change of V(a, i, s) into V(a, neg i, s") (see the 
proof of Theorem 5.1) has a positive and constant probability, namely 
p(Ob (a J)) p(x) p(Ob (k, 1) p(X) [(a Op (k, I)) (V(a, neg i s"))] . 
Hence, with probability 1 sooner or later the situation, denoted in the proof of 
Theorem 5.1 by s'", occurs. 
Now, as the random walk is symmetric and non-degenerate, the automaton 
returns infinitely many times to the point where it is in the situation s'". As proved 
above, in every such a case there is a positive and constant probability (at least 
p(£s) p(%6)) that the set H(s'") becomes inconsistent. This gives that with probability 1 
this event, so.oner or later, actually occurs, supposing the number of steps increases. 
Combining these results we obtain that, sooner or later, with probability 1 the set 
H(s') is inconsistent, which proves the theorem. 
Theorem 5.4. Consider the same conditions as in Theorem 5.1. Let, moreover, 
p 4= q or r 4= s. Then, for any a e I2, i eN, s' eS 
P{co : Cn(H(s'(co), co) = W} n {co : Cn(H(s'(co), co) - {V(a, /, s')}) * 
4= IV}) £ \p - q\ \r - s\ . 
Intuitively said, probability a lower bound of which is given in this theorem expresses 
the probability that the formula V(a, i, s) will be the source of inconsistency of the 
set H(s'). 
Proof . If V(a, i, s)eH(s), then the necessary condition for this formula being 
a source of inconsistency is that the automaton at least once returns to a. However, 
as given in Chapter 4, with a probability \p — q\\r — s\ the automaton never come 
back to a. So the assertion is valid. 
Immediately from Theorems 5.1 — 5.4 follow the two assertions: 
Theorem 5.5. Consider the same conditions as in Theorem 5.1. Then the probability 
that H(s'(co), co) contains a formula which is not valid tends to 1 if Ih (s') ~ 
— Ih (s) ~* oo. 
Theorem 5.6. Consider the same conditions as in Theorem 5.1. Let there exist 
an ReN that operations, observations, deduced and actualizations are applicable 
only if the automaton is situated in @R((0, 0>) (i.e. only moves are applicable outside 
(9R((.0, 0))). Then there is a positive probability that H(s') will never be inconsistent 
supposing p + q or r 4= s. 
Proof . Clearly, there is a positive probability that after a finite number of steps 
the automaton leaves GR((0, 0)) and never more enters this set. From the foregoing 
theorems immediately follows that there is a positive probability, for any n e N 
that if Ih (s1) — Ih (s) = n, then H(s') is consistent. This proves the theorem. 
Let us finish this paper with some remarks concerning the achieved results changing 
somehow the order in which they were proved. First, we proved that, sooner or later, 
a formula occurs in H(s) which is not valid. If the random walk is symmetric, then 
something more is valid - sooner or later the set H(s) becomes inconsistent. On the 
other hand, if the automaton can operate in an active form only in a bounded area 
and if the random walk is not symmetric, it is possible that the set H(s), though 
containing a non-valid formula (or formulas), will be always consistent. 
The possible inconsistency of H(s) can be seen from two quite different points 
of view. First, inconsistent formal representation is considered (at least from the 
usual and classical point of view) to be useless as everything can be proved inside 
this formalization. However, realize that the automaton is able to derive that there 
is something wrong with its formal representation of the environment either by 
observation or by deducing a contradiction. If the automaton ability to observe the 
environment is limited, the possibility of deducing a contradiction may become 
a very important mean assuring at least some feedback between the environment and 
its formal representation in the automaton-environment system. 
In any case, the inconsistency and inadequacy of the formal representation is an 
event requesting an appropriate intervention into the set H(s), either by the user, 
or by the automaton itself. The aim of this paper was to show that this danger is 
great to be neglected. It is a matter of a further investigation to propose strategies 
or mefhodes eliminating or minimizing the danger mentioned above. The results of 
this paper can serve as a good justification for such an effort. 
(Received December 2, 1974.) 
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